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Abstract
The article is concerned with childcare policies in the Netherlands
since the 1960s. It seeks to contribute to theories of gender and
policy formation in welfare states through its focus on political
discourses and ideological assumptions embedded in societal notions
of care. In analyzing the Dutch case, I distinguish three rationales,
respectively a moral, an interest, and an efficiency rationale, which
reflect various basic arguments on gender, care, and welfare. The
article argues that the rationale of efficiency has been particularly
important for an expansion of childcare provisions since the late
1980s. Although this rationale has provided sound arguments for
the expansion of childcare, it has been criticized by some feminists
because of the hidden assumptions in it about care. The conclusions
about the Dutch case have broader implications. In the context of
welfare state reform, hegemonic political discourses on childcare
are shifting and may have significant consequences for the relation
between gender, care, and the welfare state.
Although the Netherlands has a long-standing reputation of
being a generous welfare state with an extensive web of social provi-
Social Politics Spring 1998
e 1998 bv Oxford University Prrss
 at V
rije Universiteit, Library on October 25, 2012
http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Childcare in the Netherlands • 71
sions, the same can hardly be said of its state-subsidized childcare
facilities. Until recently the Netherlands was among those countries
in Europe with the lowest levels of state-funded childcare facilities
(Anttonen and Sipila 1996). Registered care for children under three
years was virtually nonexistent in the early 1980s (Sainsbury 1996).
The lack of facilities for young children must be seen against the
backdrop of the development of the Dutch welfare state and the
explicit and implicit assumptions about gender relations. Almost all
post-Second World War labor and social security legislation and mea-
sures were based on a belief in separate gender roles between the
(male) breadwinner and the (female) caregiver. Dutch policy makers
developed a sophisticated and extensive system of income provisions
for the nuclear family with traditional gender relations. For that rea-
son, the Dutch welfare state seems to be at the crossroads of the social
democratic welfare regime and the conservative, corporatist regime
(Esping-Andersen 1990; Bussemaker and van Kersbergen 1994). From
a gender perspective, it belongs to the "strong breadwinner model"
(Ostner and Lewis 1995), albeit a particularly generous variant (Bus-
semaker 1997a). The commonly held belief that the best way to care
for and raise children was in a family environment presided over by
a mother was the majority view well into the 1970s. Roman Catholics,
Protestants, social democrats, and liberals (i.e., the most important
political movements in the Netherlands) all agreed that a stable and
tranquil family life was the best guarantee for social prosperity.
This consensus on family policies and gender relations existed in
an otherwise strongly divided and denominationally segregated soci-
ety. The denominationally segregated society is known as pillarisation
(verzuiling). Pillarisation refers to the political system and particularly
the notion of consociational democracy as a way to create consensus
and stability in a system where no single political party had a numerical
advantage over the others. Therefore, different from many other coun-
tries, governments are coalition governments from social democrats,
Catholics, Calvinists, and liberals.1 However, pillarisation also refers
to an institutionalized system of subcultural organizations of different
religious (denominational) and quasi-religious (liberal and socialist)
groups, who all had their own organization. But despite differences
in political views, they agreed upon separate gender roles and the
notion that children should be taken care of by their mothers at home.
These attitudes began to change in the 1970s, first slowly, but
finally resulting in important shifts in perceptions of family and gender
and consequently in childcare. Whereas in the 1960s public childcare
was regarded as something immoral in a well-developed welfare state
where mothers were supposed to take care of their children at home,
in the 1990s childcare is recognized as an economically productive
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instrument of policy making to increase women's labor-market partici-
pation and thus make the Dutch economy more competitive. Childcare
has been integrated in a successful form of welfare-state restructuring,
which has recently gained international attention.
This article is concerned with analysis of political debates on (pub-
lic) childcare and traces shifts in hegemonic discourses that reflect
assumptions about gender differences. Attention to discourse and
policy debates can contribute to a better understanding of the Dutch
case, which is seen as an exceptional case in gender and welfare
state research, with its long-standing combination of extensive social
provisions but dearth of childcare facilities (Bussemaker and van Kers-
bergen 1994; Knijn 1994). Finally, analysis of the discourse on child-
care can provide an overview of the implications of recent transforma-
tions that have taken place in the Dutch welfare state.
The analysis also seeks to contribute to theories of gender and
policy formation in welfare states through its focus on political dis-
courses and ideological assumptions embedded in societal notions of
care. I take the position in this study that the programmatic concep-
tions and idioms used in political debates do not simply precede actual
policies, but they determine in part and interact with these policies;
they give shape to the way in which social relations (e.g., gender
relations) in society are perceived.2 The analysis has benefitted from
Hobson's and Lindholm's (1997) research on gendered frames of
citizenship, discursive resources, and policy formation and from Fraser
and Gordon's (1994) analysis of dependency and the reproduction of
political hegemony. Fraser and Gordon (1994) trace the genealogy of
meanings of the keyword "dependency" in historical and contempo-
rary political discourses in the United States. Previously, Fraser devel-
oped the concept of "needs-talk" (through an analysis of American
debates on need) as "an idiom in which political conflict is played
out through which inequalities are symbolically elaborated and chal-
lenged" (1989, 291).
In analyzing the Dutch case, I began with the concept of needs talk
but found that when applied to societies other than the United States,
it may not capture the complexity of discursive conflict. On one level
the Dutch debates on gender, care, and welfare from the 1960s are
expressions of needs talk. However, "need" has so many varied mean-
ings that it is difficult to sort out the dimensions of conflict, ranging
from the need of poor (lone) parents for daycare during work hours,
the need of children "at risk" for educational and moral supervision,
the need of children's social and pedagogical development more gener-
ally, the need of women for a fairer redistribution of paid and unpaid
(care) work, the need of employers to increase productivity, to the
need of the government to fight budget deficits through increasing
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women's labor-market participation. In short, need is a discursive
resource used by a range of social actors for a range of different
purposes. To distinguish more precisely between various discourses
and their inherent ideological assumptions, I consider how needs talk
is embedded in various basic arguments—what I refer to as rationales
deployed by various social actors. Using the Dutch debates on child-
care, I consider three rationales and call them, respectively, the ration-
ale of morality, interest, and efficiency. First, I consider the moral
rationale as it is linked to the debates around whether state-funded
childcare facilities can be morally justified—whether they fit with the
political hegemonic notion of the "good life" ( in the Dutch context
this refers to a long-standing notion that care for children should be
provided full-time by the mother at home). Within this rationale needs
talk refers in particular to poverty and needs of children at risk.
Second, I use the term "interest rationale" to reflect the ways in which
childcare is represented as benefitting a particular group: children,
parents, lone parents, etc. Interests thus can mean children's interest
(need) for pedagogical and social development, but it can also refer
to the interest or need of caring parents who seek to create time and
space for self-development. As we shall see, the rationale of children's
interests has a great deal of continuity and was often formulated in
opposition to the interests of parents and mothers seeking autonomy
and independence. In the discursive terrain around childcare, however,
these interests sometimes appear to overlap.
I have defined the third rationale as one that encompasses efficiency
(as well as utility and productivity). The central concern here is
whether day care facilities can be expected to contribute to economic
efficiency—for example, whether they yield a return on investments
in education made by the government and/or employers and whether
they contribute to competitiveness of the economy. This rationale is
the most recent one and gained political hegemony in a short time.
Needs will refer in the first place to the need of employers or the state
to increase productivity but can also refer to families or individuals.
Depending on the rationales chosen, discursive resources for gain-
ing political hegemony vary. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten
that these rationales can carry apparent contradictory political views.
For example, in the Netherlands denominational views on morality
have been hegemonic in the moral rationale, though one finds secular
variants in the moral rationale, including a feminist view on the ethic
of care (Tronto 1993). An interest rationale can be based on a (hege-
monic) pedagogical view of children's interest, but it can also be based
on a feminist view of women's interests in equal opportunity for
paid work and self-development. And an efficiency rationale can be
founded on a utilitarian principle of enhancing prosperity, but also
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on a feminist argument based on the need to utilize women's cultural
capital and to thus allow a contribution to economic productivity.
Just as one rationale can potentially comprise potentially conflicting
positions, a specific idea can be argued from differing rationales. For
example, feminists in favor of public day care can use rationales based
on interest and efficiency. Moreover, changes in discursive resources
can open space for a shift in interpretations—for example, from inter-
est of women where women's autonomy is the main rationale, to the
interest of employers where efficiency is the dominant rationale. Thus,
rationales as I use them should not be considered as coherent, static
frameworks but rather as dynamic framing devices that reveal how
political discourses and ideological assumptions are shifting across
time and space (in this case public childcare in the Netherlands).3
This article first provides a brief overview of various forms of
childcare and their development. Subsequently, the focus shifts to the
level of political debates and rationales. In conclusion, the various
rationales are considered in light of welfare state transitions and re-
trenchment.
Forms of Childcare and Their Development
In 1960, there were thirty day-care centers for children funded by
the Dutch state; a few companies had private-sponsored childcare
facilities (van Rijswijk-Clerkx 1981). In 1990, there were 300 regis-
tered (partially) state-funded facilities alongside over 300 company-
based and private day-care centers (Pelzer and Miedema 1990). A
policy program called the Stimulation Measure on Childcare, inaugu-
rated by the government in 1990, has been crucial for a rapid growth
of facilities since that time. During a four-year period, government's
funding to childcare provisions skyrocketed to nearly NLG 300 mil-
lion in 1994. This policy led to an increase of 70,000 childcare facilities
in a short period of time. If in 1990 only around 2 percent of children
under three were placed in state-funded day care, by 1993 this had
risen to 8 percent (European Commission Network on Childcare
1996). The percentage of children in the three and older age category
in a public childcare center is still lower (6 percent), but is partly
compensated by the fact that most children start school early.4 Never-
theless, there are still lengthy waiting lists.
The Dutch have had various forms of childcare, all of which devel-
oped independently of each other, private initiatives alongside those
publicly supported. No concerted or coherent policy existed until
recently. The few day-care facilities that existed in the early 1960s
were intended for those children who did not receive enough attention
at home and for women such as unmarried mothers who were
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"forced" to earn their own living. Children were referred to such
facilities on social or medical grounds. Many of these provisions were
administered along denominational lines. In Dutch these denomina-
tional groupings were known as "pillars." Each pillar, especially the
Roman Catholic and Protestant, but also the quasi-religious groupings
(socialist and liberal) had its own organization, including schools,
media, hospitals, trades unions, and some childcare provisions (see
Bussemaker 1997b; see, for childcare in particular, van Rijswijk-
Clerkx 1981).
These facilities were funded partly by private (charity) organiza-
tions and partly indirectly via the Poor Act which goes back to 1912.
When the General Welfare Act [Algemene Bijstandswet] was inaugu-
rated in 1965—an act which rounded out the post-war social security
system and which is often described as the jewel in the system's
crown—regulation shifted to municipal social services which were
responsible for executing the welfare act. However, some local author-
ities delegated this responsibility to the childcare facilities themselves,
which then determined entry requirements and parental contribution.
In many cases, they were less strict in their entry criteria than social
services departments. The financial relationship between the General
Welfare Act and childcare would continue from then on and had
consequences for single mothers especially, who represented the
largest proportion of recipients of income support through the welfare
act (see, for single mothers, Bussemaker et al. 1997).
But it was not only single mothers who, albeit incidentally, made
use of state-funded facilities for social or medical reasons. From the
1960s on, a growing number of often highly educated women wanted
to continue working and attempted to make use of the limited number
of existing facilities (van Rijswijk-Clerkx 1981).5 In the 1970s, the
lack of facilities led to initiatives by parents. These gradually became
more institutionalized, particularly from 1977 with government-
funded partial compensation for staff costs.6 However, their numbers
remained marginal and there was no question whatsoever of coordi-
nated government policy.
Besides childcare funded by government, there were also private
or company facilities. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, a number
of companies began organizing kindergartens in order to attract female
personnel, including van Nelle and Verkade (a coffee and a cookie
factory, respectively). Van Nelle offered care facilities as early as 1956
for working mothers with children between four and six years; the
Verkade factory set up its day care in 1961. However, these were
exceptions in a society where the consensus was that women's place
was in the home caring for children. The preferred strategy was to
attract migrant workers to make up the shortfall in labor supply
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rather than to stimulate women to take on paid work, as in the
Scandinavian, particularly Swedish, cases. Beginning in the mid-1980s
new initiatives emerged in the private sector; some companies paid
for employees, others set up their own creches. A new organization,
the Netherlands Childcare Foundation (Stichting Kinderopvang in
Nederland; SKON), which sells childcare facilities to companies on
a supply-and-demand basis, was founded for this purpose. Private
initiatives to provide childcare, for example, by companies, have been
further stimulated since the policy program Stimulation Measure on
Childcare was initiated.
Besides public and private childcare, there were playgroups. These
differed from childrens' day-care centres in that their aim was not to
encourage women to enter paid work but rather to contribute to a
child's social development. Most were open only a few hours a week.
Originally, these playgroups were established by private initiatives,
among them women's organizations in the 1960s. In the expanding
welfare state of that time, they rapidly became part of government
policy and were subsequently attributed an important social function
in welfare provisions for children.7 Until the late 1970s, they would
play a major role in pedagogica work. Although they retained popular-
ity, in the 1980s their role was partly taken over by ordinary state-
funded childcare facilities (in some cases they cooperate in the provi-
sion of part-time childcare). Interestingly, playgroups were excluded
from the policy program in 1990, particularly because of limited
operating hours.
In the 1980s another form of childcare arose, family day care or,
as it is called in the Netherlands, host parenthood. The child is cared
for in this case at the home of the care provider, although there is
some public quality control. Host parenthood is normally cheaper
than public provisions and meets some of the objections against public
childcare; host-parenthood comes closer to caring for children in the
home, if not the home of the mother.
Before analyzing the rationale underlying the recent policy program
of expanding daycare facilities, the stimulation measure, I first turn
to the analysis of the arguments in earlier decades.
Immorality, Necessity, and the Interests of Children
In the 1960s, a major political consensus existed on the undesirabil-
ity of state-funded childcare. The hegemonic discourse reflected the
moral rationale that was dominated strongly by negative associations
with public childcare. Childcare provisions were not seen as part of
new social welfare arrangements, but rather, the absence of such
facilities was proof of the achievement of the welfare state. This view
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was uncontested by most Dutch political parties in the 1960s. In their
view, public childcare might have been necessary in times when a
proportion of the population was living in poverty and mothers were
forced to leave the home for paid work. But it was regarded as
something immoral in a well-developed welfare state as the Nether-
lands (Bussemaker 1993). Public childcare also had a political moral
dimension, as it was linked to totalitarian regimes of oppression and
state control. In the 1950s, the decade dominated by the Cold War,
only the communist-party-aligned Dutch Women's Movement (Ne-
derlandse Vrouwen Beweging; NVB) advocated childcare. The NVB
pointed out the facilities available in Eastern Europe that enabled
women to participate in paid labor (and thus to form part of the
working class). For many others, childcare facilities in Eastern Europe
were reflections of a godless, regulated society.
Fear of state control, particularly of education, has to be understood
in terms of the Dutch tradition of pillarization, which provides differ-
ent subcultural (religious) groups with their own educational institu-
tions. Though they are publicly financed, they are privately governed
and thus have a rather high autonomy vis-a-vis the state. Public child-
care, all the more because of its potential link to education, was
therefore easily viewed as an attack on subcultural organizations and
their autonomy. In addition, an exceptionally strong motherhood
ideology reinforced the idea that care of children should properly
occur in the family—preferably by the mother. If married women
with children did work, then they would later apologize, saying: "but
my children never suffered" (Moree 1992).
The pervasive view that emerged in the 1960s was that the Dutch
welfare state had evolved toward a higher moral ground where poverty
no longer existed, where women were no longer forced to work, and
where childcare was, therefore, superfluous. In other words, childcare
was associated with former, undesirable conditions (poverty), or with
contemporary, undesirable political systems (totalitarianism). Posi-
tively formulated, it assumed that it is better for both children and
women to be at home and dependent on a breadwinner.
The end of the 1960s, however, saw a cautious shift in the discourse
on childcare away from an absolutist (religious-dominated) moral
rationale. Women in the Labour Party (PvdA) reflected on changes
in the mother-child relationship in 1969: "One of the primary
changes, we believe, is that we no longer see the separation between
mother and child as 'sinful'. By that we mean the toddler and childcare
centres that are growing up in a number of cities and regions of the
country" (Ons Werk 1969). At the same time, a new discursive fram-
ing (Hobson and Lindholm 1997) of interest emerged with regard to
the social development of children, particularly for part-time play-
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groups. This occurred in a context of ongoing expansion in the welfare
state and an increase in government influence on education and social
work, among others. Strikingly, anxieties over state control did not
surface in the public debate on playgroups. Instead, the discourse on
children's interest took in issues of care and social development.8 As
a consequence, the playgroups became an integral part of social policy.
This had a slightly positive effect on acceptance of part-time public
childcare provisions. Moreover, it created some room for a still cau-
tious formulation of childcare in terms of socially desirable facilities
for children.
In 1969, the responsible secretary of state for Culture, Recreation
and Social Work (Cultuur, Recreatie en Maatschappelijk Werk;
CRM), would put forward both essential and desirable reasons for
childcare:
I am also thinking, for example, of the situation of an only child
who needs contact with other children. I am thinking of the
situation of the single father or mother and of those cases in
which families are hit by illness or invalidity or where the mother
is overburdened. Finally, in this respect, I also think of those
situations which occur in certain neighbourhoods and in which
children living on the umpteenth floor of an inadequately sound
insulated building will find it very difficult to express their natu-
ral exuberance. (Tweede Kamer, Handelingen II 1968-1969,
2317)
But despite the new discursive terrain that opened up around chil-
dren's interest, politicians did not see paid work for women—unless
strictly necessary—as a valid reason for childcare. In that respect,
the moral rationale noted above still persisted. As a result, a strong
ideological distinction was made between the interests of children,
which became widely respected, and those of women which were
only taken into consideration in very special circumstances (medical
reasons, for example, and incidentally for lone mothers who went
out to work).9
Feminist action groups that emerged in the late 1960s as part of the
feminist movement began to challenge the hegemonic interpretation of
children's interests. A key issue among feminists was the elimination
of barriers to women's participation in public life, and the lack of
alternatives, other than the full-time care for children by mothers at
home, was one of their targets. Moreover, some of them were inspired
by Marxist ideas about collectivization and alternative ways of care-
giving and education. They extrapolated on the rationale of children's
interests and also pointed out women's interest in collective childcare.
Man-Woman-Society (Man-Vrouw-Maatschappij; MVM) and Dolle
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Mina (literally "crazy Mina"), the two best-known feminist groups,
prioritized childcare. In January 1970, Dolle Mina took action by
organizing an "open-air creche." Later that same year, both organiza-
tions, along with NVB, carried out local and nationwide creche ac-
tions, organizing demonstrations in various cities (with the slogan
"we are not kangaroos, we want creches") and presenting a petition
to the government, asking for public childcare (van Rijswijk-Clerkx
1981).
These women's organizations wanted expansion of childcare to a
general basic right. They questioned fundamentally the view of day-
care facilities as emergency provisions for "defective" families, its
association with morality, and the limitation of the rationale of interest
to the interests of children. By formulating interests in such general
terms they represented public childcare as a basic citizen's right for
all parents, whether they were in the labor market or not.
Apart from an incidental increase in lunch-break facilities at some
primary schools, these feminist claims for childcare as a basic entitle-
ment did not have much effect. And although on paper feminist groups
such as MVM and Dolle Mina advocated expansion of subsidized
childcare, they increasingly took fewer and fewer initiatives to achieve
them. Their attention moved to other issues (abortion, for example).
Further, issues concerning the care for children in general and public
day care in particular began to challenge feminist positions, and discur-
sive conflict emerged. Some feminists simply didn't want to think that
the movement should become absorbed in children and care because
they thought women had done this long enough. Others questioned
the role of the state in the provision of day care. Moreover, even
feminists in favor of public day care came to realize that the demand
for childcare as a right and the expansion of provisions was light
years away. Appeals for childcare based on women's interest for
autonomy evoked such an such strong resistance that many feminists
put the issue aside.10 There was no discursive space to question the
political hegemonic discourse on children's interest, which was by
then the only acceptable rationale for public day care.
Consequently, although publicly funded facilities began to gain
more recognition within the political sphere in the early 1970s, femi-
nist arguments based on the entitlement of women to public childcare
disappeared, and the only rationale in the public debate was one based
on the social and pedagogical development of children. This point of
view is reflected in a study on the desirability of childcare commis-
sioned by government and carried out by the Working Group on Policy
Analysis for Child Centres in 1974. The working group concluded that
the interests of children should be central to childcare and did not
see as desirable "greater numbers of women going out to work than
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is currently the case, even if good and financially accessible . . . day-
care centres are available" (CRM 1974, 6).
The working group did see the interests of the child as reason to
expand the emerging toddler care centers, but argued strongly against
full-time public care. The report reflected the general societal view at
that time: part-time childcare can be useful from the point of view
of children's development, but should not be advocated to enhance
women's autonomy or economic independence.
In conclusion, the moral rationale that dominated since the 1960s,
an ideology of motherhood and care shared by opinion leaders, began
to lose its absolute hegemony in the early 1970s, when a rationale of
interests began to gain ground. But in the early 1970s, there was only
room for the formulation of children's interests. As soon as women
began making claims for childcare for women's emancipation and
autonomy, the moral rationale moved back in, blaming mothers for
being egocentric and socially irresponsible. A democratic, developed
welfare state, in which care for small children was provided by the
mother and took place in the home, was still seen by many as the
highest level of moral development; the detachment of mother and
child was seen as sinful.
Women's Interests and Childcare as a Controversial Issue
The moral rationale was kept alive during the 1970s. The notion
that childcare in a developed welfare state is a vice was still put
forward in 1978 by the prominent social-democratic economist and
Nobel prize-winner Jan Tinbergen. He saw state-funded childcare as
an indicator of social and cultural crisis: "A place of custody for
children is necessary in a society where poverty obliges both parents
to work; not in a prosperous society; there must be adequate realiza-
tion that nothing is more fascinating that the raising of an infant or
toddler" (Tinbergen 1978, 65). The welfare state, in Tinbergen's view,
had made child day-care centers superfluous. This attitude expresses
the fear of the elevation of childcare from something born from neces-
sity to a virtue. Such a view represents a familiar moral rationale in
which the emphasis lies on the higher moral ground which the welfare
state has reached because it has liberated society from grave poverty.
But by the end of the 1970s, the moral rationale, although still to
be found, had lost much of its political hegemony. In the meantime,
a rationale gained ground in which the interest of children's social
development was expressed. Moreover, in the late 1970s, the parents'
(and mothers') interest in childcare, which disappeared after the short-
lived feminist actions from 1970, was again raised, although very
cautiously. That occurred in a context in which some parents had
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established their own kindergartens to make up the shortfall in state-
funded facilities. By now, conflicting interpretations of interests had
become the subject of debate in the formal political arena of the
parliament. But the interpretation of interests gave rise to heated
differences of opinion. This is apparent, for example, in 1977 when
the Dutch parliament (known as the Second Chamber) debated a
seemingly straightforward point on income tax deductions for child-
care for single parents. Tax deductions are a popular policy instrument
with regard to care issues, and the proposal itself was not special.
What makes it interesting are the implicit assumptions that structured
the proposal and that were debated in parliament. The government's
proposal would make costs of home family care deductible for single
parent families, irrespective of the parents' participation in the labor
market. But it would not deduct the costs for state-funded childcare
for the same group. As an alternative, members of parliament argued
for tax deductions for family care at home and public childcare. But
at the same time, they wanted to restrict the deduction to lone parents
working outside the home. The two conflicting positions in the debate
(from the government and the opposition in parliament) reflect a
range of contested positions: between care for children in the private
and the public sphere, between single-parent and two-parent families,
between rights and needs, between deserving and undeserving clients,
and between male and female roles and tasks. Two hypothetical cases
structured the debate; the first, introduced by the Dutch minister of
finance, was the case of a single father who has family help, does not
work outside the home, but derives his income from a pension. The
secretary of state wanted to provide a deduction as compensation for
the loss of care tasks that would have been performed by the man's
wife. The second case, presented by members of parliament, was an
equally hypothetical case of a divorced woman with children.
Shouldn't this woman be equally or even more eligible for family care
if she worked outside the home? The minister thought not, arguing
that in that case one "would weigh whether and to which extent a
person as single parent is able to care for a family. I find the idea
quite gruesome . . . to introduce a distinction on this point. . . . The
example of the man is much more striking than that of the woman;
this proposal is also intended to facilitate the man's position (Tweede
Kamer, Handelingen II 1977-1978, 74). Of course, the secretary of
state was passing a judgment on the capacity of parents to care for
their children, making a distinction between men and women that
assumed that women were the main caretakers in families and that
would remain unchanged.11
Not only does this example show the implicit assumptions in vari-
ous rationales, it also reflects a more contested discursive terrain, as
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expressed by the oppositional view of members of parliament. In the
final bill, parents with costs for childcare outside the home were
eligible for the tax deduction (regardless of whether they work outside
the home).
In some respects 1977 was a high point in gender-equality discourse
and policy, and childcare issues were part of these debates, although
the relation between childcare and women's autonomy, particularly
in relation to labor-market participation, was still very much disputed
(Bussemaker 1991). In the mid-1970s a new discourse on formal
gender-equality policies emerged, pursued by a left-wing coalition
government from 1975. In 1977 the first white paper on women's
equality policies, Emancipatie, proces van verandering en groei
(Emancipation, Process of Change and Growth) was published. Child-
care was addressed in this paper, but cautiously. It was noted that
childcare can contribute to parents participating in diverse activities
in social life, but its authors had a specific idea in mind about the
diversity of activities. They were thinking about part-time voluntary
work in addition to homework, rather than about professional full-
time jobs. Women's labor-market participation was not even men-
tioned. According to the government, the policy was aimed primarily
at providing parents with supplementary support in raising and guid-
ing the development of their children. The government concluded that
day-care centers mainly meet an essential interest of single-parent
families. People who are not dependent on full-day care were said
to prefer playschools; these would give parents (in reality primarily
mothers) the opportunity to pursue voluntary and educational activi-
ties (Emancipatie, proces van verandering en groei 1977).
However, soon after the inauguration of a new Christian-democrat/
liberal cabinet in 1977 (see, for coalition cabinets, note 2), there was
an opening for the autonomy argument in childcare debates. For the
first time, paid work or education was viewed as a valid option for
all parents, not just lone parents. Left-wing parties and some liberal
politicians placed increasingly more emphasis on women's interests
as a part of the childcare debate. Various politicians remarked that
equality policies had no chance of success without accessible and
affordable childcare. They considered childcare as a vehicle for wom-
en's autonomy and independence and recognized the necessity for
women to break away from the household to gain personal develop-
ment. As I have discussed earlier, these arguments initially had been
put forward by some feminist groups, although not very forcefully.
Moreover, feminists were still divided about the issue of public child-
care. Some radical feminists wanted to divorce feminism from chil-
dren's issues. There were also a number of feminist groups that wanted
a more fundamental division of labor between men and women; they
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were afraid that public childcare provisions would leave the role
of fathers and the organization of the labor market untouched (cf.
Sevenhuijsen and de Vries 1980). In addition, some left-wing feminists
(pacifist green feminists) doubted whether labor-market participation
should be the central means to independence for feminists—they were
more in favor of a basic income. Consequently, public childcare did
not have their specific attention, but was regarded as only one part
of a larger strategy to collectivize care and labor.
The strong and outspoken advocates for public childcare were
women from the social-democratic and communist party, also sup-
ported by women's groups in the trade unions and some women of
liberal parties. They argued that childcare was essential to achieve a
fairer redistribution of labor both within and outside the home. They
saw its potential for increasing women's participation in the labor
market and thereby their autonomy. Their view slowly became more
influential, partly as an effect of growing attention to equal treatment
of men and women in the labor market and social security arrange-
ments (a consequence of EU directives) and partly as an effect of
emerging discussions about welfare-state restructuring. Finally, in
1982 there was a discursive opening for claims that public childcare
was a means for developing women's independence through their
labor-force participation. Two women parliamentarians used this mo-
ment of political opportunity and asked government to produce a
statutory and financial regulation for as many different kinds of child-
care as possible. In addition, they maintained that public childcare
should be expanded. In fact, they argued, together with various cham-
ber members, for childcare as a universal basic provision (Tweede
Kamer, Handelingen 1981-1982, 17100, XV, no. 41).
This surge of feminist claims-making around childcare was short-
lived, however. After the government fell and new elections were
called a couple of months later, the notion of childcare as a basic
entitlement went into political netherworld. The new government
(liberals and Christian-democrats) set up an Interdepartmental Work-
ing Group on Childcare in 1983 whose purpose was to generate
proposals that would lead to childcare regulation. But the newly
appointed minister, Christian-democrat Brinkman, made explicit his
view that childcare and equality policies had low priority in the new
government. In effect, he swept the idea of childcare as a basic provi-
sion from the table, arguing that this would make childcare a right
and elevate it to the level of education or health care (Bussemaker
1993). Underlying this policy ranking was his belief that public child-
care provisions would threaten care in the family. What he sought
was a redefinition of needs and interests in childcare, which once
again highlighted children's interests in social development and de-
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fleeted away debate on childcare as facilitating women's autonomy
and independence.
The opening up of discursive space in the public and political debate
on childcare that emerged in the 1970s was short lived. There are
several reasons for this closure: one obvious reason was the shift
toward more conservative government. Other explanations for the
failure of feminists to keep up the momentum are twofold: the wom-
en's movement was not strong enough and they had not built a viable,
recognized constituency in the political arena. Perhaps even more
important was the lack of consensus within the women's movement
itself—whether or not public childcare should be viewed as a common
interest of women.
Restructuring the Welfare State and the Rise
of the Rationale of Economic Efficiency
As in many other countries, the Dutch welfare state came under
attack in the 1980s for its inefficiency and lack of incentives to increase
productivity. A new rationale emerged that linked childcare to eco-
nomic productivity.12 In this context, it is useful to look at the argu-
ments employed by critics of the welfare state.
Roughly speaking, there have been two kinds of criticism in the
Netherlands. The first is neo-conservative criticism, which focuses on
perverse effects the welfare state has engendered such as the "immoral
ethos" (Adriaansens and Zijderveld 1981). This critique comes pri-
marily from Christian-democratic ranks. They have advocated an
alternative to public provisioning that takes the form of a moral call
for a caring society and restoration of citizens' responsibility. The
other criticism leveled at the welfare state is the neo-liberal or social-
liberal variety, primarily heard from politicians of the right-wing lib-
eral party, but it also comes from some social democrats.13 The main
thrust of this challenge is toward a more efficient welfare distribution,
particularly through an increase in labor-market participation.
In the Christian-democratic ideology, there is a strong emphasis
on the perverse effects of the welfare state. According to this view the
state has taken over some important responsibilities that traditionally
belonged to structures such as the church, local communities, and
particularly the family. But instead of supporting the traditional func-
tion of these structures, welfare state facilities contributed to a further
deterioration of these structures. Consequently, the demand for wel-
fare provisions increases, and the situation gets worse rather than
better (Hirschman 1991). In the Christian-democratic ideology, the
immoral ethos is the expression of the perverse effects of the welfare
state: the welfare state has broken down traditional structures and
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has increased selfishness, rather than solidarity and community. In
this framework, state-funded childcare embodies both the evils of
government interference and control in private life, as well as the
indifference and selfishness of individual citizens who allow their own
interests to prevail over those of their children. The reinstatement of
personal responsibility and of traditional values and social ties, they
believe, are the best remedies for bloated welfare state spending. Here
we find traces of the original Roman Catholic principle of subsidiarity,
that comes down to a reserved policy on care measures: responsibilities
should be decentralized to the lower level communities in society,
among them the family and voluntary initiatives.14
In the Christian-democratic ideology, the rationale of morality was
making a comeback in the 1980s. This happened, for example, in
1986 when Hedy d'Ancona, a prominent social democrat and one of
the founders of the Man-Woman-Society back in the 1960s, advocated
state-funded childcare as a basic provision (d'Ancona 1986). In reac-
tion, the chairman of the Christian-democratic party in parliament,
De Vries, referring back to the association of public childcare with
totalitarianism, accused her of proposing "state control in raising up
children"; he coupled moralism to anti-state socialism. One could
also see the Christian-democratic minister with primary responsibility
for childcare, Brinkman, expressing a moral rationale. He maintained
that in a country where the labor-market participation of both women
in general and married women in particular was around 40 percent
in the mid-1980s (OECD 1992; Hooghiemstra and Niphuis-Nell
1993), and of that percentage about half were in (short) part-time
jobs less than 20 hours a week (OECD 1991), and almost no one
took their children to a day-care center five days a week (European
Commission Childcare Network 1990), he concluded the Netherlands
was in the throes of a kind of "American situation":
Is it not absurd that in many families the norm is for children
to come home when it suits them. The notion of 'the icebox is
open, switch the TV on, mom and dad will get home sometime'
is hardly family life?! . . . Very many families no longer exist as
such because both man and woman have to work or want to
work and that value is considered of more worth than raising
a child. . . . And then, of course, you could set up day-care cen-
tres and after-school facilities, but then you're leaving your chil-
dren to fend for themselves, (quoted in Bussemaker 1993, 204)
The care of children in state-funded facilities is seen as an expression
of selfishness and self-interest. Clearly, government subsidized child-
care is rejected; only host-parenthood is considered an option within
the "new morality" of the Christian democrats.
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The neo-liberal criticism of the welfare state concentrates on pro-
hibitive costs and the harmful effects of welfare provisions on depen-
dent individuals; according to this view these provisions produce
another perverse effect: they encourage a culture of dependency in-
stead of independency. The remedy is a return to individual responsi-
bility and less regulation, allowing the play of the market to regulate
economic and social life. In addition, citizens should be encouraged
to bear responsibility for their own lives. There is no place in this
framework for expansion of state-funded childcare; instead childcare
is seen as a private responsibility. A more moderate version of neo-
liberalism, however, which we may call social liberalism (a term that
better expresses the influence of neo-liberal ideas within traditionally
strong European welfare state such as the Dutch; cf. Mahon 1997)
does accept a rationale for the expansion of childcare facilities, al-
though the preferred course is the combination of market and govern-
ment services. According to this rationale, the state has a responsibility
to increase citizens' independence, particularly economic indepen-
dence, by contributing to the conditions for independence, including
childcare.
The social-liberal position gained in popularity in the second part
of the 1980s. Within this view, childcare is presented as a means to
decrease state dependency (particularly of lone mothers) and expensive
welfare provisions (particularly for breadwinners) and to increase the
benefits of women's labor-market participation to the state (because
of taxes and contributions they will pay). Consequently, childcare is
assumed to contribute to economic productivity and competitiveness
and is coupled to the efficiency rationale. This rationale provides
sound arguments for the expansion of childcare: these facilities can
contribute to the stimulation of (still very low) labor-market participa-
tion of women and thus reduce the costs of the welfare state, while
at the same time countering the waste of female talent and state
investment in women (e.g., education) because the expectation is that
women will remain in the workforce after having children.
The rationale of efficiency has the potential to create a bridge
between social-liberal and feminists actors, particularly those women's
groups in political parties and trade unions. Both argue that women's
labor-market participation needs to increase and that this requires
childcare provisions. By the late 1980s, liberals, social democrats, and
influential advisory bodies such as the Social Economic Council and
the Scientific Council for Government Policy (Wetenschappelijke
Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid; WRR) all emphasized the significance
of childcare for the labor market; at issue here were no longer families
or the state, but rather employees, companies, and government.13
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The social-liberal argument had become so hegemonic at the end
of the 1980s that now even the Christian democrats could concur
with expansion of childcare as an instrument of labor market policy.
The argument that women's labor-market participation should be
stimulated to ensure funding of the welfare state and the assumption
that childcare can play a significant role therein was hardly debatable
by the end of the 1980s. Formerly expressed moral and social objec-
tions are now few and far between.
The definitive turnabout came in 1990 when the Scientific Council
for Government Policy (WRR) produced its report, Een werkend
perspectief (A Working Perspective). The WRR report and the re-
sponses to it from political parties can be considered a definitive
recognition of childcare as precondition for women's labor-market
participation (WRR 1990). Thereby, the interest of women in public
childcare has become a respected interest, but not so much because
of women's autonomy per se, but much more because of the potential
contribution of women's labor-market participation to the public
treasury and the fight against high social security and welfare expendi-
tures.
It was the new coalition cabinet made up of Christian democrats
and social democrats, inaugurated in 1989, which developed the policy
program to increase childcare, the stimulation measure, in 1990, using
the WRR report as its legitimation.16 This measure is a landmark in
Dutch childcare policies; the cautious policy on childcare makes way
for a stimulatory policy. Only the small right-wing Christian parties
continue to oppose childcare. Other parties sparred briefly on the
best form of funding; should it be in cash or in kind? Again, the
recommendations of the WRR were followed which meant an in-kind
solution of investing in mainly state-funded facilities.17 The cabinet
reserved NLG 300 million for investment in childcare over the ensuing
four years (the period would later be extended until 1997).18 The
responsible minister is the feminist and social democrat Hedy d'An-
cona. However, the stimulatory policy does not encompass a universal
basic provision, as d'Ancona had proposed in 1986, but a combination
of allocation based on social grounds, on waiting lists for people
living in local catchment areas, and a fixed number of places reserved
for company care. The idea is that the government (through national
incentives, supplemented with local funding), parents, and companies
will each contribute to childcare. Parental contributions are calculated
according to income; special deductions are created for companies.
In addition, the regular day-care centers should reserve a certain
percentage of their places for companies which buy them. The goals
appear only partly successful; sometimes there is limited interest from
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companies while parents face long waiting lists—as a result places
remain unused even though there is great demand. Nevertheless, in
comparison with earlier times, childcare facilities have grown rapidly.
The political hegemony of social liberalism became clear in 1994
when a new government of social-democrats and liberals came into
power: this was the first government since World War I in which
denominational (religious) parties were not represented. They cer-
tainly support women's labor-market participation (their central polit-
ical slogan is "jobs, jobs and jobs") and are aware of problems in
the combination of (unpaid) care work and paid care. At the same
time, however, the current government strongly focuses on shared
responsibilities. Childcare is, according to the government, a shared
responsibility of parents, employers, employees, municipalities, and
the state. A main part of the organization of childcare provisions has
been delegated to employers and employees, who have to negotiate
childcare in their collective labor agreements. The results vary: in
some branches of industry childcare provisions are well organized, in
others there are only a few provisions or they are only available
for female workers. The government has particularly stimulated an
increase in childcare provisions within companies. Now half of all
provisions for childcare are linked to companies. Moreover, new in-
centives were made for employers in 1996: they get a tax deduction
of 20 percent for the costs they incur for childcare for their employees.
This incentive is part of the governmental attempt to stimulate compa-
nies even further to set up their own childcare policy through an idea
borrowed from the U.K. and known as Opportunity 2000. Though
some expansion in childcare may occur given the steady increases in
women's labor force participation, the ball has been put more and
more in the court of employers.
State responsibility has also decreased as an effect of decentraliza-
tion to municipalities. Since 1996 a main part of the responsibility
for funding has shifted from national to local government.19 Munici-
palities now have a budget which is no longer ear-marked exclusively
for childcare. As a result, childcare must compete with other interests
and provisions, such as a new soccer pitch or language courses for
migrants.
New problems also arise. The recent investments in childcare pro-
visions focus particularly on very small children. Provisions for chil-
dren of compulsory school age (schooldays end early in the Nether-
lands) are still ill-developed and show up as a new problem. Moreover,
the current policy facilitates the labor-market participation of middle-
class women much more than women with poorly paying jobs; the
latter usually work in branches of industries where childcare provis-
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ions are not very well organized, and they are more dependent on
state-subsidized childcare provisions.
Dutch childcare policies are at a crossroads: there is still a choice
to be made between expansion of more public childcare (according
to the view that childcare is a basic provision and a right, similar to
education) or a further privatization and decentralization of childcare.
This choice will probably be made in the short term when recent
childcare policies will be evaluated. The long-term prospects for
expansions in publicly supported childcare facilities are not too good.
Rather than a fairer redivision of labor both within and outside the
home (the feminist position), the rationale of economic efficiency has
had the greatest influence on the policy to expand childcare facilities.
Arguments of efficiency, combatting wasted human (i.e., female) capi-
tal, and enhancement of productivity appear to have been highly
persuasive for building broad-based support for investment in child-
care. In fact, they are part of a larger and rapid restructuring of the
Dutch welfare state, which has taken place recently, and which has
been known as the Dutch "poldermodel."20 At the same time, diverse
notions on accessibility (cf. the idea of a basic provision) have disap-
peared into the background.
The moral rationale, after making a short comeback in the 1980s,
by now certainly no longer holds currency. The rationale of children's
social development continues to play a role. It is often heard in discus-
sions of childcare as a means of early discovery of problems in chil-
dren's social development and is directed toward children of single
mothers or migrants, but it no longer plays a dominant role in public
discourse. What appears as pervasive in the public discourse on
childcare are the idioms of efficiency, productivity, and financial via-
bility.
Conclusion
The attitude that childcare was both undesirable and generally
unnecessary in a well-developed welfare state like the Netherlands,
prevalent in the 1960s, had been transformed by the 1990s. The
notion that public day care is immoral, apart from a small group of
children at risk and from mothers in need, is now replaced by a notion
of day care as an instrument of socioeconomic political policy and a
means to combat the waste of women's human capital and investments
in education. The dominant rationale for childcare expansion in the
1990s, the rationale of efficiency, is not an isolated one, but it is part
of a broader discourse to legitimate welfare state reform. The very
debate about welfare state provisions, whether or not they relate
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directly to gender relations, is carried on with economic idioms as
the main discursive resources.
Concomitant with the development of arguments concerning child-
care is a shift in attitudes to women. Those who in the past perceived
women's desire for childcare outside the home as a dangerous expres-
sion of self-interest now view it as a valid economic choice. The
relationship between social spheres has also changed: childcare has
moved from being a private responsibility to a more public economic
issue.
Childcare has been expanded, but on balance should this be viewed
as a positive step for women's emancipation? The answer depends
on the point of view one takes. The answer is "yes" if one focuses on
the availability of childcare for women's labor-market participation: in
spite of the long waiting lists, women's labor-market participation
and thus their economic independence has increased. The answer is
"no" if one focuses on the social value of care, for the emphasis has
come to rest almost exclusively on the rationale of efficiency in which
the value of childcare provisions is primarily instrumental: can they
facilitate and increase women's labor-market participation, not do
they improve the quality of life or the conditions of work outside and
inside the home.
Interestingly, although the public support for childcare has in-
creased, some feminists still question childcare policy, while even
feminists once positive to childcare now have doubts, particularly
because of the hidden assumptions in the rationale of efficiency. One
of the assumptions is that care and labor are a zero-sum relation; the
less women are compelled to care for their children at home, the more
female labor market supply will increase. Yet apart from the fact that
this relation has been questioned in empirical studies (Maassen van
den Brink 1994), it also raises more disturbing questions. For example,
the rationale of economic efficiency does not allow space to discuss
moral and ethical dimensions of care (Sevenhuijsen 1993), since such
dimensions cannot be expressed in terms of economic assets and
profits. It is also hard to discuss reasons for childcare provisions other
than labor-market participation (e.g., for self-development, education,
leisure activities or participation of women in public life). In addition,
the interests of the elderly and other dependents on care labor, which
until recently was usually performed by women, have disappeared
into the background of the debate (see Knijn and Kremer 1997). As
women have less time to do this caring work, a main point of discus-
sion should be who shall care for them. Finally, the role of fathers is
not really taken up as a point of discussion. Since the rationale of
efficiency relates childcare provisions to women's labor-market partic-
ipation, fathers seems to play no role (as some firms only pay for
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childcare provisions for their female employees, not for their male
employees). All together, issues of care cannot simply be put into the
cost-effectiveness box.
The Dutch case also illustrates that a positive relation between
women's autonomy and public childcare should not be taken as self-
evident. How the policy emerges, what discursive resources are avail-
able, who are the political actors developing the rationale and imple-
menting policy are key variables in analyzing the potential outcomes.
One can turn to the Scandinavian, particularly the Swedish, develop-
ment of childcare policy to illustrate this point. Swedish childcare
policies and its relation to the female labor supply have often been
mentioned as a positive example, and this is even sometimes used as
a legitimation for recent Dutch politics. But in Sweden femocrats
and women's groups in political parties were key actors in shaping
childcare policy (Hobson and Takahashi 1997; Mahon 1997). The
point to be made here is that childcare policy is not an export commod-
ity that can be transplanted into a different social and political context.
Moreover, it cannot be transported over time either; the argument
that childcare provisions are in the interest of women to increase their
labor-market participation had a very different meaning in the 1970s
(when such a policy was implemented in Sweden), than in the 1990s
in a more social-liberal framework, as is the case in the Netherlands.
The conclusions about the Dutch case have broader policy implica-
tions. Particularly in the context of welfare state reform, as is the case
in many countries nowadays, the discursive terrain around childcare
is highly contested and reveals shifting political hegemonic discourses
and new ideological assumptions, which may have significant conse-
quences for the relation between gender, care and the welfare state.
NOTES
A grant from the Foundation for Law and Government (REOB), which is
part of the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research, gave me the
opportunity to rewrite my study of childcare policies in the Netherlands
(originally published in Bussemaker 1993). I remain grateful to Barbara
Hobson for her support and willingness to help me improve my arguments.
1. Between 1918 and 1994, denominational parties have always been in
power (with either social democrats or liberals). It is only in 1994 that the
first coalition government of social democrats and liberals was formed.
2. This is the point that Hobson and Lindholm (1997) make in their
analysis of discursive resources and policy formation.
3. My source material consisted primarily of parliamentary reports from
the period since 1960 until recently. In addition, influential publications by
politicians in the media (magazines, newspapers, books) are included in the
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analysis as well as party political publications insofar as childcare is the main
theme.
4. Compulsory education begins officially at five years old, but almost all
parents take advantage of the early start option which allows children to
begin in their fourth year. If we count these children, then there is state-
funded care for 56 percent of children aged between three and five (European
Commission Network on Childcare 1996), although part-time. In contrast
to public childcare, these facilities are undisputed and are not part of the
contested ideological debates. I therefore exclude them from my analysis.
5. Around that time, the labor market participation of Dutch women was
extremely low, particularly among married women. For example, in 1960
26 percent of women and 7 percent of married women between the ages of
16 and 65 were in the labor force. In 1970 this was, respectively, 31 and 17
percent (OECD 1992; Hooghiemstra and Niphuis-Nell 1993). It is only since
the 1980s that the labor-market participation of Dutch women has been
growing more rapidly. In the 1990s the official participation rate of women
is similar to that in the U.K. and Germany, although many more Dutch
women work part-time.
6. This relates to the so-called state contribution regulation which came
into force in 1977. This regulation was also intended to terminate the "abuse"
of the welfare act from which day-care facilities had been partially funded.
Due to a shortage of alternative facilities, parents in the medium to high
income groups also made use of day-care funded by welfare. At the same
time, the regulation signified a cautious recognition of the care arrangements
that had emerged.
7. The Working Community Childcare Centers in the Netherlands (Werk-
gemeenschap Kindercentra Nederland; WKN) emerged as early as 1970 after
a merger between two other organizations, the Central Association for Day-
care Centers and the Playgroup Committee. In contrast to political develop-
ments, both forms of childcare moved closer together under WKN auspices.
In practice, however, the WKN focused strongly on the rights of children,
especially from strategic considerations. As a result, it contributed (uninten-
tionally) to the formulation of a (mock) contrast between needs and interests
of children and of mothers.
8. The differences in the way childcare and education are treated is even
more striking in view of the early (compulsory) school age (see above).
9. In the early 1970s lone mothers were still a rather marginal phenome-
non. Most of them (almost 50 percent) were widows, while 30 percent were
divorced (Bussemaker et al. 1997b). Only a few lone mothers were in the
labor force.
10. Only the NVB continued to push for provisions geared to mothers
working outside the home (van Rijswijk-Clerloc 1981).
11. It would appear more likely that single mothers would need child care
rather than family care, especially if they are attempting to earn their own
living. There is also a further ideological assumption in the reasoning of the
secretary of state; through his example of a single father, the implication is
of a man whose wife has died; when single mothers are mentioned, it is
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quickly assumed that they are divorcees. Divorcees' concerns are apparently
less deserving than spouses whose partner died.
12. Such a perspective had only been formulated very incidentally by some
economists in the early 1970s; however, at that time they did not gain much
attention (Bussemaker 1993).
13. The more neo-liberal influence, as it has been formulated in the Dutch
context, needs to be distinguished from a laissez-faire liberalism that focuses
exclusively on the market. In the Dutch context, "social liberalism" is more
accurate. In fact, social liberalism is the label some more right wing social
democrats as well as some right-wing liberals use to express their views. For
a similar distinction, see Mahon (1997).
14. The central idea of subsidiarity is that the state should not interfere
with problems which could be better solved by other, lower-level, communi-
ties, because of their place in the organic social order. Only when lower-
level organs, such as the family or private (religious) initiative, fail in taking
their responsibilities, does the state come in. Subsidiarity, however, also
assumes that the state has a responsibility to facilitate the ability of the lower-
level organs to perform their duties. As a consequence, the state is assumed
to guarantee that families can manage their responsibilities by helping them
where necessary, for example, to provide the conditions for care within the
family (see Bussemaker 1997b).
15. Whereas in their political rhetoric, liberal Christian-democrat govern-
ment pointed to "placing responsibility with citizens rather than with publicly
subsidized institutions," actual practice already had shifted increasingly to
market forces. In a short rime, numerous private initiatives emerged which
sold childcare places to parents at "market prices." They filled the gap left
by government.
16. Earlier, in 1989, a long-expected government position paper on child-
care appeared which spoke of a "rigorous additional impulse because of
labor-market considerations" (Regeringsstandpunt Kinderopvang 1989, 5).
17. The government did deviate from the WRR proposal to generate a
"stimulatory fund" in which all government and third-party contributions,
including those of employers and employees, would be brought together.
Such an approach should have fit very well in the Dutch corporatist structure.
18. This figure consisted partly (NLG 130 million) of funds that had
become available due to changes in the tax system.
19. Some parts of policy had already been decentralized before. For exam-
ple, in 1987 the protection of quality of childcare facilities and some of the
allocation of childcare facilities were already decentralized as part of the Act
of Welfare Work.
20. The "poldermodel" has recently been used in international political
circles to express the Dutch way of welfare reform (also called "the Dutch
miracle"). From being known as one of the most expensive welfare states
with a high level of inactivity (and therefore welfare dependency) in the
1980s, the Dutch welfare state by now is known for its strong economic
growth, low unemployment without an tremendous increase of inequality
(as in the U.K. and the United States). The increase of labor-market participa-
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tion is largely an effect of the increase of women's labor-market participa-
tion—with childcare policies as a means to achieve a higher female labor-
market participation. However, as I have argued elsewhere, the "Dutch mira-
cle" is more successful in adapting its economy to international standards,
rather than creating a social infrastructure that is in tune with contemporary
patterns of work and care (Bussemaker 1997d; see, for a comparative interna-
tional perspective, Bussemaker 1997c). The dominant rationale for expansion
of childcare provisions is a good illustration of the imbalance between eco-
nomic and social features in the Dutch "poldermodel."
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